SETTING THE LEGAL SCENE 'Half an hour after the accident I was called from London by the solicitor's Jirm of the Lloyds insurers of El
One of the first things El Al did was to set up an emergency fund, which was operated from Crans's office. Checks on the truthfulness of claimant's allegations were made with the help of the housing corporation 'Nieuw Amsterdam', which owned the two apartment buildings and was much better informed about their tenants than the municipal register of the inhabitants. All of our interviewees underlined the practical and non-legal character of their work during the weeks following the disaster; it had more to do with fulfilling basic needs (shelter, medical services, relief centres, welfare benefits, insurances, etc.) than what is at the core of this article, i.e. disaster litigation, American style.
Legal thinking began again on 14 October, when the mayor of Amsterdam announced that illegal immigrants who could prove they had lived in one of the 230 apartments that had been hit by the crashing plane could apply for legalization of their stay in the Netherlands. It triggered a wave of legalization requests, not only in Amsterdam, but from all over the Netherlands and from parts in the world that had nationals living in the Bijlmer, especially Ghana, Surinam and Pakistan. A three-room flat, allegedly inhabited by more than 30 people, was no exception, and rumour had it that one could buy statements of residence for Fl 5,000. About 2,000 requests were reduced to 91 legalizations of illegal residence, and another 38 immigrants were granted a residence permit on humanitarian grounds. We will not pursue this side issue, but all the attorneys interviewed referred to the painstaking process of preparing a well-founded compensation claim in close consultation with the client. How can you tell the truth from a lie in the absence of documents?
The victims of most air crashes are the passengers on the passenger list. As a consequence, the total number of claims to be expected is known shortly after such a disaster. In the Bijlmer disaster, however, various categories of an unknown number overlap: legal and illegal inhabitants who were not at home, relatives and friends watching television at the inhabitant's home (a popular sports program was on at the moment of the disaster), and people who (claimed they) were nearby and suffered shock damage.
The first American case-hunters to arrive (and the last to leave) were Philip Stuto, a detective, and Terence Ford, an 'aviation consultant', who had been expelled from the Californian Bar Association for embezzlement. They prepared the way for Gerard C Sterns of the law firm Sterns, Walker & Lods (San Francisco) . From the middle of October they rented an office, recruited intermediaries and a Dutch sole practitioner, for one purpose only: to acquire as many clients as possible, especially in the prized category of next of kin of deceased persons and severely wounded victims, under a contingency fee contract of 30 per cent. They gave a presentation in the Americain hotel, in downtown Amsterdam, on Monday 19 October. Also in the second half of October, the Ghanaian community in the Bijlmer organized a memorial service and invited some attorneys. This strange mix of mourning and informing was the outcome of a failed effort by Sterns to contract the Bijlmermeer Collective. A few days earlier he had offered them a group of Ghanaian victims in return for a negotiable percentage of his contingency fee. During the mourning and informing session Ford showed compassion and business instinct at the same time. The Dutch attorneys present were disgusted. They said that there was no need to decide on the spot and they pointed out that a joint action would lower the fee percentage.
Crans thought to do good when he distributed in the relief centres a list of attorneys who were members of the Dutch Bar section on personal injury. However he aroused the indignation of other attorneys who were not on the list but who had had experience of the previous air crash three years earlier.
THE MID-ATLANTIC COMPROMISE
On 13 November, Crans organized a meeting in his office, which was attended by approximately 25 attorneys. Keith Gerrard of Perkins Coie, the Boeing law firm, was present, as well as Martin and Franklin. The message they tried to convey to the Dutch attorneys was that litigation in the USA would get nowhere since the American judge would consider himself a forum non conveniens. Secondly, Boeing would act as if liable without explicitly saying so. In the background was the assumption that a claim-receptive attitude on the part of Boeing might persuade any American judge that a denial in the USA would not put an end to justified claims. Under the implied (implicit) condition that the Dutch attorneys would refrain from taking legal action in the USA, Boeing would be willing to accept claims via Crans's law firm. Thirdly, American compensation standards were out of the question. In particular the 'turbo factor', as Crans put it in the interview, of punitive damages would be left out. On the other hand in hard cases of emotional damage, notably loss of relatives, the very restrictive Dutch standard would be relaxed. Overall, the outcome would be somewhere between continental Europe and the USA a mid-Atlantic compromise, as it was called. Both firms, however, hired an American attorney on an hourly fee: this was Dick Crutch, who was practising law in Seattle (in the same building as Gerrard, in fact), for his expertise on American law.
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ATTORNEY HOPPING AND CLIENT KIDNAPPING
The availability of two different strategies, and of different percentages within the contingency fees strategy gave rise to the counterpart of ambulance chasing, namely 'attorney hopping'. In the first few months the two firms together had about 15 attorneys on the case. At Crans's office, nine attorneys worked day and night during the first month, and it is estimated that the firm still spent 1,000 chargeable hours on the case in 1997, five years after the disaster.
INSIDE OR OUTSIDE THE DANGER ZONE
In the spring of 1993, Gerrard had received most claim files, 
BACKGROUND
The distinct advantages of oil and gas over other forms of 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
To understand the legal aspects of oil and gas projects in India it is important to appreciate the manner in which this area is regulated and dominated by the two major public sector enterprises: Oil India Limited (OIL) and the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC). Both these undertakings are state-owned companies engaged in the exploration, development and production of hydrocarbon resources, accounting for approximately 92 per cent of the total oil and gas produced in the country. Their role in management and decision making, particularly with regard to private investment and along with that of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (MPNG), was further strengthened in 1974, when this sector was nationalised.
Refining and marketing of oil is conducted by several public sector companies including the Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOC) and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL).
The state owned enterprises do not seem, at present, keen to
give up acreage and in fact ONGC is still contesting existing awards of acreage on the grounds that with their indigenous knowledge and expertise they are potentially the best operators.
Furthermore, these undertakings are currently, and quite
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